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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the entry of Summary Judgment
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
presiding.

This court has jurisdiction of this appeal

pursuant to Section 78-2-3(j) Utah Code Annotated (1953),
as amended.

-iii-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF:

:
:

RUSSELL S. FARRELL,

!

Decedent.

:
: Appelate Court No. 91002

PHYLLIS FARRELL,

:

Petitioner and Appellee, :
v.

:

DEANNE FARRELL PORTER, DAVID :
JONATHON FARRELL, and LORI
;
P. FARRELL,
:
Appellants

:
PRIORITY 16
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON PRESIDING

Duane R. Smith
Attorney for Appellants
310 South Main Street
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Robert H. Wilde
Kelly De Hill
Attorney for Appellee
935 East South Union Avenue
Suite D-102
Midvale, Utah 84047

-1-

Statement of the Issues on Appeal
1.

Should the lower Court's ruling that the Appellee

Phyllis Farrell is the widow and heir of the Decedent
Russell Farrell be upheld?
2.

Have Appellants filed a frivolous appeal?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Phyllis Farrell, the widow of the Decedent Russell S.
Farrell, filed on August 22, 1990 in the probate court of
the Third Judicial District Court a Petition for
Determination of Heirs. The natural children of the
Decedent filed an Objection to the Petition on the grounds
that because a divorce action had been initiated, albeit
not completed, before Farrell's death, Phyllis Farrell
should not be considered the surviving spouse of the
Decedent.

Phyllis Farrell moved for Summary Judgment on

this issue with a supporting affidavit. Appellants failed
to file supporting affidavits for the allegations and
arguments made in their Memorandum in Opposition.

After a

very brief oral argument, the Trial Court ruled that
Phyllis Farrell was legally and lawfully married to
Russell S. Farrell at the time of his death and was,
therefore, the Decedent's widow and heir.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Phyllis and Russell Farrell met in 1975.

(R.

2.

Phyllis and Russell Farrell were married on April

51).

22, 1978 (R. 51).
3.

Russell Farrell died on August 15, 1989 while

working on a fishing vessel off of the coast of Valdez,
Alaska. (R. 51).
4.

A Decree of Divorce, Civil No D89-1198, was

entered on August 21, 1989 because Phyllis Farrell had not
yet been contacted concerning the death of her husband.
5.

The Decree of Divorce was set aside and vacated

on October 2, 1989 upon the motion of Mrs. Farrell.

(R.

52)
6.

The only purported Will of Russell Farrell which

has been identified was executed on the 18th of February,
1965 (R. 52).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellee Phyllis Farrell is the widow and heir of
the decedent Russell S. Farrell. They were legally
married at the time of the decedent's death.

Although the

Appellee had filed a Complaint, there was no final order
of any kind in place when the decedent died.
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The law in

Utah, and generally in the country, is that a divorce
proceeding abates upon the death of a party•

Further, the

Divorce Decree that was mistakenly entered after the death
of the decedent is void and without effect.
The Appellants' appeal is without basis in law or in
fact, and is, therefore, frivolous. Accordingly, Appellee
is entitled to an award for damages and for her attorneys
fees and costs.
ARGUMENT
.1.
PHYLLIS FARRELL IS THE WIDOW OF RUSSELL FARRELL
Phyllis Farrell was legally married to Russell
Farrell at the time of his death; neither party disputes
the fact that there was no final decree of divorce in
place.

However, the children of the decedent argue that

because a divorce decree was entered after Farrell's
death, such decree should somehow be applied retroactively
or that the Stipulation signed by Russell Farrell should
be considered a final order.
The general rule of law to be applied in this matter
is discussed

at 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation,

Section 176:
"A cause of action for a divorce is purely personal,
and it has been held that such a cause of action
terminates on the death of either spouse; and if an
action for a divorce is commenced, and one of the
parties dies thereafter, but before the entry of the
-4-

final decree, the action abates. The judicial power
is ended when a party dies before the entry of a
decree; if the court thereafter grants a divorce in
ignorance of the death of a party the decree is
void..."
The law in Utah has followed the general rule.
In Daly v. Daly, 553 P.2d 884 (Utah 1975), the Utah
Supreme Court followed the general rule and held that a
divorce decree was ineffective, even though it had been
signed by the Judge prior to the death of the party, when
the death occurred during the interlocutory period and
before the divorce was final. The Utah Supreme Court
elaborated on this issue further in Nelson v. Davis, 592
P.2d 594 (Utah 1979), when it held that the death of one
of the parties during a divorce action abated the action,
and the status between the parties, including their
property rights, reverted to what it was before the action
was filed.
In this case, Farrell died on the 15th of August,
1989.

The Decree was entered erroneously due to

Appellee's unawareness of her husband's death ten days
earlier.

That Decree was subsequently vacated, nunc pro

tunc, and accordingly is void with literally no effect
whatsoever.

Even without the order vacating the Decree of

divorce, the entire divorce action was abated by the death
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of Mr. Farrell on August 15, 1989.
Since the action was abated and the Decree of Divorce
was void, Phyllis Farrell became the widow, and thus an
heir, to the estate of Russell Farrell. The Court should
so hold and affirm the ruling of the lower court.
.II.
APPELLANTS CITE INAPPLICABLE STATUTORY LAW AND CASE LAW
Appellants city Utah Code Annotated Section 75-2-803
(a) as the statutory law which determines that Appellee is
not the surviving spouse of decedent. Appellants maintain
that because the decedent stipulated to an entry of the
divorce, the divorce should somehow be considered final,
bringing Mrs. Farrell within the parameters of the
statute.
The facts in this case are clear and undisputed:
there was no final decree of divorce in place at the time
of the decedent's death, nor was there an interlocutory
decree of divorce, or an order of any kind terminating the
parties1 marital interest.
Accordingly, not only is U.C.A. Section 75-2-803
inapplicable to this case, but the case relied upon by the
Appellants, Prudential Insurance Company of America v.
Dulek, et.al, 655 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1981), is also
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inapplicable and of no assistance.
In Dulek the domestic court had already issued a
Decree of Divorce at the time of the decedent's death.
Dulek at 218. This must be compared to the case at bar in
which no Decree of Divorce was entered.

In Dulek the

court's decision turned upon the following fact:
The record establishes that Bonnie Dulek had
participated in valid divorce proceedings which had
yet to become final... By entering the separation
agreement, and thereafter obtaining a Divorce Decree,
Bonnie became a party to a valid proceeding (a
divorce) in which the State Court entered and issued
an Order purporting to terminate all property rights
against the decedent, Chace Dulek." Id. at 220
(emphasis added, parenthesis in the original).
In Dulek, the Court held that the wife, undergoing a
divorce, did not become an heir or a widow because an
order had been entered terminating her status prior to the
decedent's death.

That important distinction

differentiates Dulek from the case at bar and removes
Dulek from the category of the cases previously cited
which hold that the wife remains married even if a Decree
is entered after the death of the husband.

See also

Linson v. Johnson, 575 P.2d 405 (KA 1978) and In the
Matter of the Estate of Chandler, 431 N.E.2d 486 (IL
1988).
Appellants concede that that divorce decree entered
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after the death of the decedent is void.
Brief at p.10).

(Appellantfs

However, Appellants offer a rather

tortured interpretation of Section 75-2-803 and its
accompanying editorial comments in an effort to convince
the Court that the Decree was void due to a mere
jurisdictional defect and should be considered effective
for the purpose of the statute.

The Appellants do not

specify the nature of the alleged jurisdictional defect,
although they imply that the problem here is caused by the
Corut's lack of jurisdiction and authority over a dead
person.

What the Appellants refuse to recognize is that

the Divorce Decree is void in this case because one simply
cannot terminate a marital relationship by a divorce when
it has already been terminated by a death.

The further

language of the editorial comment cited by the Appellants,
which states that "where there is only a legal separation,
rather than a divorce, succession patterns are not
affected", suggests that marital harmony between the
husband and wife are not required in Order for the wife to
be a widow and/or an heir.
Appellants have failed to present any law or fact to
support their position that Mrs. Farrell should not be
considered a surviving spouse even though she and Russell
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Farrell were legally married with all of the attendant
marital rights and responsibilities, until his death.
The children suggest that this is an equitable
proceeding.

Utah law, however, holds that Probate Court

acquires its jurisdiction solely by statute. In re: Harris
Estate, 105 P.2d 461 (Utah 1940).
Appellants argue that it is unfair to have Mrs.
Farrell declared the widow of the decedent.
provide no basis for this claim.

However, they

The Appellant's

allegations, as set forth in their Memorandum in
Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment and
in their appeal brief, attempt to guess at the motives and
thoughts of the decedent, the Appellee, and the
legislature.

Yet, the Appellants offer no authority,

testimony, or support for their assumptions.
The reality is that Mrs. Farrell should be declared
to be the widow of the decedent because that is the law
and because she is the deserving party. Phyllis and
Russell Farrell were married eleven years, during which
time Phyllis moved with her husband numerous times,
endured his frequent job changes and constant financial
problems.

During the time he was in Alaska, they

corresponded often and obvious affection,
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discussing their financial situations and the problems his
children had caused in their marriage. Mrs. Farrell
continued to pay both their debts and to manage their
financial affairs up to and after Mr. Farrell's death.
The Appellants, decedent's natural children, and the
decedent had been estranged for several years prior to the
decedent's death.

The Appellants had never accepted Mrs.

Farrell nor her marriage to their father. Now, the
Appellants, who with rare exceptions, wanted nothing to do
with their father during the latter period of his life,
hope to gain monetary satisfaction from his death and seek
to disinherit his wife of eleven years.
It appears that Appellants are offended that Mrs.
Farrell did not attend the first available default
hearing.

They make much of the fact that the divorce

could have occurred at an earlier date an prior to the
decedent's death.

Whether or not the divorce could have

taken place sooner is irrelevant.

They have no basis to

impugn Appellee's character by implying that she was
somehow negligent by not getting divorced as soon as
possible, as if she could foresee that her husband would
pass away so unexpectedly.
Finally, Appellants claim that it is unfair for the
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Court to refuse to terminate the marital relationship
retroactively where the decedent had signed a Stipulation
and Consent.

The Appellants argue that "the only

impediment to a final decree was the passage of time,
nothing more." (Appellant's Brief at p.12).

Another

obstacle to a final decree can be reconciliation and a
dismissal of the action.

Indeed the opportunity for

reconciliation is one of the policies behind the statutory
waiting period.
.III.
APPELLANTS HAVE FILED A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
Rule 33(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
states the following:
For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded
in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a
goood faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing
law.
A) APPELLANTS1 APPEAL AND BRIEF ARE NOT GROUNDED IN
FACT.
Before the lower court, the Appellants submitted a
Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary
Judgment in which they made numerous factual allegations
that were unsupported by the records. The Appellants
submitted no affidavits or documents.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
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provides,
"Supporting an opposing Affidavit shall be made on a
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts that
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is confident to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto
or served therewith...When a Motion for Summary
Judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts, showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so the
record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if
applicable, shall state as a numbered sentence or
sentences of noted facts disputed."
Nothing in the children's memorandum remotely
complies with the provisions of Rule 4-501.

Even those

"facts" which may be obtained by the court taking judicial
notice of the domestic file were not identified to that
file.

In others words, the "facts" set forth by the

children are not facts as required to be set forth under
the rules but are merely statements of counsel upon which
the children may not rely in opposing a Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires,
"the judgment sought shall be entered forthwith if
the pleadings, deposition, answers to interrogaotres,
and Admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled
-12-

to judgment as a matter of law."
Rule 56(e) requires,
"when a motion for Summary Judgment is made and
support as provided in this rule, an adverse party
may not rest, upon the mere allegations where denials
of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial, if he does not so respond, Summary
Judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him." (emphasis added)
In Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985),
this Court said
"...that when a Motion for Summary Judgment is made
under the rule, the affidavit of an adverse party
must contain specific evidentiary facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. We held that
plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
defendants having failed to identify with specificity
any material fact.
Appellant's affidavits in the instant case are
deficient for the same reasons. Affidavits reveal no
evidentiary fact but merely reflect the affiant's
unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions in regard to
the transaction concerned."
In the case before the lower Court there were
literally no affidavits or other appropriate evidence
presented to the Court in response to the Appellee's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Where in Treloggan
ineffective affidvits were held to be insufficient to
avoid Summary Judgment, here the Appellant's failure to
submit any affidavits to support their unsubstantiated
"facts" was certainly insufficient to oppose the motion.
-13-

Had the appellants wished additional time in which to
submit affidavits, they were entitled to rely on the
provision of Rule 56(f) which authorized continuance of
the hearing on Summary Judgment pending the obtaining of
such affidvits. No such relief was sought.
At the lower level, this case was procedurally
identical to Amica Mutual Insurance Company v. Schettler,
768 P.2d 957 (Utah 1989), where the Court held that:
"when the moving party has presented evidence
sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, and
the opposing party fails to submit contrary evidence,
the trial court is justified in concluding that no
genuine issue of fact is present or would be a
trial."
Because the appellants presented absolutely no sworn
evidence

below, their was no conceivable circumstance

under which they could hve avoided the appellee's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

This was particulary true in light

of the fact that their stated "facts" includes, for
example, statements such as the following:
"following the execution by Mr. Farrell of the
acceptance he moved to the State of Alaska and
commenced full-time employment, not returning to the
State of Utah";
"the only reason why the petitioner and the decedent
were not divorced prior to his death was th inaction
of the petitioner"; and
"the decedent was not only corresponding with Phyllis
but also corresponding with another lady and had
promised to meet this other woman when he returned
-14-

from his fishing trip."
(Appellant's Memorandum at pages 2 and 3)
The lower court erred in considering Appellant's
Memorandum where the factual allegations were unsupported
in direct contravention of Rule 56. Accordingly,
Appellant's Memorandum is not properly before this Court
on appeal and hould not be granted any weight in the
decision-making process.
The Appellant's Brief should not be considered as
well, since it cites, as support for the brief's factual
allegations, the Appellant's own defective and improper
Memorandum.
Appellant's refusal to comply with proper procedure
and to support their facts by the record results in the
consequence that none of Appellants' facts are properly
before the Court and cannot be considered.
Appellants's appeal is not only without basis in fact
due to substantial procedural error.

Their appeal is also

frivolous because the facts, as conceded by the
Appellants, show that the Appellee and decedent were
legally married at the time of his death and that the
Divorce Decree entered subsequent to his death is void and
ineffective.

Yet Appellants have insisted in arguing the
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issue further in a vain and expensive attempt to rewrite
the history of the case.
B) APPELLANTS1 APPEAL AND BRIEF ARE NOT WARRANTED BY
EXISTING LAW.
As discussed above, Appellants1 reliance on U.C.A.
Section 75-2-803 is ill-founded since that statute applies
only if a final order terminating the parties' marital
relationship is in place at the time of the decedent's
death.

Since the divorce was not final in this case, the

statute does not apply.
Appellants fail to recognize or refute the existing
law in Utah as set forth in Daly

and Nelson.

They rely

on a federal case with facts that are crucially different
than the fact situation in the case at bar.

Appellants

have not provided to this Court, nor did they before the
Court below, any statutory law or case law that is on
point and applicable which would survive a summary
judgment motion or justify an appeal.
C) APPELLANTS HAVE NOT PRESENTED A GOOD FAITH
ARGUMENT AS TO WHY THE LAW PRESENTED IN UTAH SHOULD NOT BE
FOLLOWED.
Appellants have tried to prop up their appeal with
unsupported and unsubstantiated claims and assumptions
regarding the intent of the legislature, the policies
behind the "surviving spouse" statute, and the thoughts of
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the decedent.
The Appellants1 attempt to persuade the Court that
the decedent's nondependent adult children are more
deserving and more just heirs than the decedent's aging
wife of eleven years.
Appellants' appeal cannot be considered to have been
made in good faith where their claims are unsupported by
the facts or by law, and without any justification
presented to the Court for overturning the present law in
Utah.
D) APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD FOR DAMAGES AND
TO RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS.
Appellants have forced Appellee to incur severe
financial strain to protect her status as the widow of the
decedent. As discussed above, Appellants' appeal is
frivolous and baseless, without merit or justification in
law or fact.
Therefore, Appellee respectfully requests that Court
to award her damages and the recovery of attorney's fees
and costs and that a separate hearing be held for the
limited purpose of determining the amount of attorney's
fees and incurred by the Appellee in responding to
Appellant's appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The Appellee is the widow and heir of the decedent
Russell S. Farrell. Appellee and the decedent were
legally married at the time of decedent's death.

The law

in Utah, as set forth in the cases of Daly and Nelson, is
that upon the death of a party, a divorce action abates
and the status between the parties reverts to what it was
before any action was filed.
Therefore, the divorce decree entered after the
decedent's death is void and without effect.
Appellants have not submitted any statutory law or
case law to support heir argument.

The Appellants have

failed to present any facts to support their position.

In

addition, what facts they have presented are unsupported
by the record and are presented in a procedurally
defective manner.

Since their appeal is without any basis

in law or in fact, it is frivolous.
According, the Appellee should be awarded damages and
an award for her attorney's fees and costs incurred in
responding to this appeal.
Wherefore, Appellee respectfully requests that the
Court uphold and affirm the ruling of the Trial Court on
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment and find that
Appellee is the widow and heir of the decedent.
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Appellee

requests that the Court rule that Appellants have filed a
frivolous appeal and that the Court award Appellee an
award for damages and her attorney's fees and costs. The
Appellee requests that Court remand this action to the
lower court for a hearing on the limited issue of the
amount of attorneys fees and costs incurred by Appellee
and for a determination as to whether the Appellant or
their counsel should pay said amounts.
DATED this

/ 5- day of July,

1991.

IT
Attorney/for Appellee
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed to the following
via first class mail, postage prepaid thereon, this
day of July, 1991.
Duane R. Smith
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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